The tragic events in Nairobi this week – where a simulated terror drill at a university was mistaken in panic for a genuine attack, with one person dying as a consequence and others being injured – reflect the many ways in which terrorism can affect societies. But are there patterns to our responses to the threat of non-state terrorism and, if so, might recognition of these patterns help us as we think of how best to react?
Three main errors of response repeatedly emerge through the long history of terrorism, and each continues to have damaging effects for us all.
First, overreaction. Psychologists have convincingly shown that we tend all too often to make judgments about wide patterns of phenomena on the basis of a small number of easily remembered and dramatic episodes. Terrorism offers many examples. Whether 9/11 or 7/7 or Paris in November of this year, the shocking images and stories associated with terrorist attacks write themselves prominently into our thinking. And this leads us to exaggerate the threat.
So, for example, while it is likely that an Islamic State-related attack will indeed occur in London before too long, it is equally true that the chances of any individual Londoner actually being hurt or killed in such an attack are extraordinarily small. Of course we should recognise the threat that there is. But reacting effectively to it – as individuals or as societies – requires that we also keep it in proper proportion.
This has implications for government policies, as well as for individual lifestyles. The latter should, if we act logically, continue fairly normally given the level of the threat currently existing in the UK. Government policy should also avoid overreaction, especially of the kind that has so worsened things politically in the past with responses to terrorism (from Belfast in the 1970s to Iraq in the early 21st century – and to Syria, if we are not wise, over coming months).
The second problem is our tendency towards unrealistic and short-term expectations in our responses to terrorism. An atrocity occurs – whether on a Tunisian beach or in Paris or elsewhere – and the public demands that the threat be stamped out. But while individual terrorist groups will come and go, terrorism as a method of political struggle will outlive us all. Learning to live with, and to lessen, the threat makes more sense than falsely expecting to be able to get rid of it. Voters and politicians alike need to remember this.
The third unfortunate response that affects our lives all too often amid terrorist anxiety is the trend towards polarisation. Within the UK in recent years, the issue has been most pressing with regard to relations between Muslims and other members of society. Non-state terrorist groups tend not to achieve their central, strategic goals. But they do have a strong record (whether intentionally or not) of producing division, polarisation and enmity as a response to their violence. This should be resisted as far as possible.
As most people now acknowledge, the errors of the post-9/11 western “war on terror” led to increases in the number of terrorist incidents and terrorist-generated fatalities. Much of that grew out of an exaggeration of the kind of threat that was actually faced, out of a demand for and a belief in unrealistic and short-term victories, and from the use of rhetoric and political action in ways that polarised national and international communities alike. If we want to limit the degree to which callous, non-state terrorist violence damages individuals and societies, then these lessons are ones we must remember.