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Nuclear options

This article is more than 15 years old
Inspections are pointless. There are better ways to dissuade the Iranians from developing a bomb

Should we be worried? The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that the Iranians' uranium enrichment programme is proceeding, though perhaps at a slower pace. Iran is not answering questions raised by western intelligence. The IAEA cannot exclude the possibility that the Iranian programme has military aspects. So, yes, there should be concern, but there is even more reason to be distressed that this has been going on for years in full view, yet has not been met with effective diplomacy.

The demands that Iran should accept ever more inspection are meaningless. They are not made to help Iran show its lack of weapons intentions but in the hope that convincing incriminating evidence will be found. However, if such evidence is not found it will - rightly - be said that even if there were no intention today to move to bomb-making, Iran could change its mind next year. The key point at issue is not Iran's intentions but its development of an industrial-scale capability to enrich uranium. Once such capability exists - whether in Iran, Egypt, Turkey or Indonesia - the country would be a shorter time away from a bomb if it wanted to make one. The further countries in sensitive regions are from that capability the better.

Years have been lost to ineffective approaches. Europeans and backseat- driving Americans have demanded that Iran must suspend its enrichment programme before they are ready to dignify the country with direct negotiations. As Iran has simply continued to develop the programme it is Europe, not Iran, that has become eager for negotiations.

The Obama administration is wisely declaring that it can have direct talks with Iran. Much is at stake. Failure to dissuade Iran from developing industry- scale enrichment could have dangerous consequences. Can Iran be dissuaded?

In the 1980s when Saddam Hussein was moving Iraq towards nuclear weapons (and Israel bombed the Osirak research reactor) Iran clearly could have claimed a strong incentive to develop a nuclear programme with a weapons option. However, after the defeat of Iraq in 1991 and 2003 Iran can no longer see the nation as a nuclear threat. Nor can it fear a nuclear attack from any neighbour, or even Israel. In these circumstances it might have been counterproductive for the Bush administration to threaten Iran by talking about all options being on the table and by dispatching aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf. The Obama team might do better by adopting the line taken by the US in the talks with North Korea, and offer as part of a nuclear agreement guarantees against attacks from the outside and subversive activities inside Iran.

Further, the US has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since 1979. It seems likely that a prospect of such relations and of a place in regional discussions would offer Iran a greater incentive to reach a nuclear agreement than the Bush team's statements that "Iran must behave itself". In the case of North Korea, diplomatic relations with both the US and Japan have been held out as part of a nuclear agreement. It is hard to see why it should be more difficult in the case of Iran.

Iran has invested resources and prestige in its enrichment programme. Can it walk away from it? Well, it would not be the first in the world to abandon nuclear plants. Under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty there is a right to enrich, but there is no duty to use the right. Iran must weigh costs and benefits. It must be aware that buying uranium fuel would be less costly than producing it, and that forgoing such production would be compensated by strong international fuel-supply assurances. And finally, it must be aware that enrichment in Iran might lead to enrichment in other Middle East countries.

Hans Blix was head of UN inspections in Iraq in 2003

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