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10 questions Tony Blair must answer at the Chilcot inquiry

This article is more than 14 years old
Did Blair believe regime change would really be the aim of military action, not disarmament? and how much influence did Blair have over US policy?

1 What assurances did Tony Blair ­ privately give to President Bush, and when?

Alastair Campbell told the inquiry Blair frequently sent private notes to Bush. "I would say the tenor of them was that … we are going to be with you in making sure that Saddam Hussein is faced up to his obligations and that Iraq is disarmed," Campbell said. "If that cannot be done diplomatically and it is to be done militarily, Britain will be there." In a note of a meeting of the two leaders on 31 January 2003 Sir David Manning, his chief foreign policy adviser, wrote: "The prime minister said he was solidly with the president."

2 Did Blair believe regime change would really be the aim of military action, not disarmament?

Leaked documents show that despite advice from the then attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, and others, that force to bring about regime change was unlawful, Blair nevertheless privately agreed with Bush that this was the objective of an invasion. Blair appeared to admit this in a BBC television interview last month when he said he would have invaded Iraq even without evidence of WMDs.

3 How much influence did Blair have over US policy?

Very little, evidence suggests. Blair could not persuade Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, to think again about his "shock and awe" tactics during the invasion, or the aggressive approach by the US military afterwards. Blair has been credited with persuading Bush to go down the UN "diplomatic route". The question this raises is whether this was mainly to get international and domestic backing for an invasion, rather than to ensure military action was legal.

4 Why did Blair make such firm assertions and claims in the foreword to the now discredited ­dossier on Iraq's WMD programme?

Blair claimed that according to assessed intelligence it was "beyond doubt" that Saddam was continuing to produce chemical and biological weapons. Sir John Scarlett, then chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, distanced himself from the claim, saying the foreword was "an overtly political statement" at the inquiry last month. Blair has also said he was not aware that the notorious "45-minute" claim referred only to battlefield weapons and not long-range missiles.

5 Why was there so little discussion about the legality of an invasion?

Goldsmith advised Blair in 2002 that regime change was not a lawful aim of military action. The inquiry has heard that Blair rarely faced up to the issue of international law and when Goldsmith eventually gave formal advice it was very late in the day. The cabinet was not shown his advice. He said he recalled telling the cabinet on 17 March 2003, three days before the invasion: "Well, there is another point of view but this is the conclusion I have reached [namely that war would be legal after all]. Then the discussion on the legality simply stopped."

6 Why did Blair assure Lord Boyce, chief of the defence staff, that the evidence Saddam was still in breach of his disarmament obligations was 'unequivocal'?

Boyce demanded this assurance because he was worried about British military commanders being prosecuted at an international court. The evidence was based on what is now known to be wrong intelligence. Blair made the assertion even though UN weapons inspectors could have been given more time, the inquiry has been told.

7 How and where were the crucial decisions made?

Evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, and to the 2004 Butler inquiry into the use of intelligence, showed Blair took decisions in small groups meeting informally. No minutes or formal record were taken of some meetings. A key ministerial cabinet subcommittee never met and no "war cabinet" was set up in the run-up to the invasion.

8 Why wasn't the military planning more effective?

Military commanders were not allowed to prepare properly for war until late 2002 because ministers were concerned about the reaction at a time when the UK was still involved in diplomacy at the UN. As a result, expensive "urgent operational requirements" (UORs) had to be ordered and some kit did not arrive before the invasion.

9 How did Blair prepare for the aftermath?

Scant attention was paid to this, according to the evidence, despite Britain's Geneva conventions obligations as an occupying power to protect the civilian population of an invaded country. Intelligence about the economic and social conditions in Iraq were as poor as that on the country's weapons arsenal.

10 What role did Gordon Brown have and how much attention did Blair pay to the financial resources that British troops needed?

Campbell described Brown as "one of the key ministers" Blair spoke to about Iraq. Geoff Hoon, the former defence secretary, told the inquiry the Treasury under Brown forced military planners to cut their budget, depriving British troops of much-needed helicopters.

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